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Abstract—In most of the approaches aiming at investigating
Android apps, the release time of apps is not appropriately taken
into account. Through three empirical studies, we demonstrate
that the app release time is key for guaranteeing performance.
Indeed, not considering time may result in serious threats to the
validity of proposed approaches. Unfortunately, even approaches
considering time could present some threats to validity when
release times are erroneous. Symptoms of such erroneous release
times appear in the form of inconsistencies with the APIs
leveraged by the app.
We present a tool called MoonlightBox for uncovering time
inconsistencies by inferring the lower bound assembly time of
a given app based on the used API lifetime information: any
assembly time below this lower bound is considered as manipu-
lated. We further perform several experiments and confirm that
1) over 7% of Android apps are subject to time inconsistency,
2) malicious apps are more likely to be targeted by time
inconsistency, compared to benign apps, 3) time inconsistencies
are favoured by some specific app lineages. We eventually revisit
the three motivating empirical studies, leveraging MoonlightBox
to compute a more realistic timeline of apps. The experimental
results confirm that time indeed matters. The accuracy of release
time is even crucial to achieve precise results.
I. INTRODUCTION
In just a decade, Android has grown to be the leading
operating system used in a variety of mobile devices ranging
from smartphones to home appliances such as TV sets. In this
period, the development of apps for the platform has increased
steadily: as of April 2017, the official app market, Google Play,
was distributing over 2.8 million apps [1]. Several alternative
markets also make available a considerable number of apps [2].
Given the impact of Android apps in consumers’ daily activ-
ities and the openness of its framework, Android has quickly
become a hot topic in the software and security research
communities. A simple search of the “Android” keyword on
Google Scholar lists over 300,000 article entries going back
to 2008 when Android was first introduced.
Among the many research directions explored in the lit-
erature, some of them explicitly take into account the release
time of Android apps. Generally, in software development, the
release time corresponds to the time a package is distributed to
users. In the Android ecosystem, such time could be matched
with the market upload time. Unfortunately, current research
datasets, including the AndroZoo continuous stream of apps,
do not provide such metadata information. In this context,
app assembly time appears to be a valid indicator of release
time, since the delay between the assembly and upload time
should be negligible since any additional change performed
on the code or on app resources will necessarily require a
re-assembly. Considering the APK file alone, app assembly
time is approximated by checking the last-modified time of the
main DEX file building from the app source code. This time is
then usually considered as the release time and is used in the
literature to drive approaches or design experimental validation
scenarios. For example, Arash et al. [3] compare app assembly
time against the release time of a patched library to find
vulnerable apps: they consider a given app to be vulnerable if
it contains a vulnerable library and it was not updated after the
patched library was released. Allix et al. [4] demonstrate that
most state-of-the-art machine learning (ML) based malware
detection approaches introduce some bias in their classification
when they simply pick a random set of known malware to train
the malware detector. They argue that those approaches are
not realistic (i.e., not useful in practice for detecting zero-day
malware), as they may train on apps collected “in the future”
to test apps “from the past”. They also empirically show
that by correctly taking time into consideration (e.g., training
apps “from the past” to test apps “in the future”), ML-based
classification results are significantly impacted (in a negative
way), comparing to the cases where time is not considered.
Overall, all of these examples show that time information is
important for Android-related research approaches.
Unfortunately, the assembly time of Android apps is readily
manipulable, either through intentional manipulation or due to
mistakes in environment settings (e.g., when the development
computer system date is reset), resulting in wrong time in-
formation for Android apps. In this work, we refer to this
manipulation behaviour as time inconsistency. Because of
time inconsistency, the evaluations of all the aforementioned
approaches, which have considered time information as one
of their essential parts, will present threats to validity.
In this paper, we propose to mitigate these threats by pre-
senting a research tool called MoonlightBox1, which attempts
to identify the most recent Android APIs that are used by
learning from evolution histories of the Android framework
base. Given an Android app, MoonlightBox computes its
lowest possible assembly time, and uses it to flag apps that
are subject to time inconsistency: apps, which according to
1A precious artefact referenced in the fantasy-comedy film entitled “A
Chinese Odyssey”. MoonlightBox can open up a time portal, when moonlight
shines on it, for its users to travel in time.
their release time, would be calling APIs that do not yet
exist since such APIs introduction dates are posterior to
the release time.
Although there is no definitive data on the processes through
which apps come to present time inconsistency symptoms, we
can propose a theory on potential reasons why manipulation
can be intentional. Legitimate app developers and malware
writers can manipulate app assembly times with different
motivations. For example, “opportunist” developers may sim-
ply regularly update an app assembly time (without actually
changing anything) to pretend that it is actively maintained.
After modifying the app code (i.e., DEX file), attackers would
like to change the introduction time of the DEX file so as
to pretend that the DEX file is unchanged. Similarly, app
repackagers may opt to change the assembly time of the
repackaged version of an app to make it appear anterior to its
original counterpart, ensuring that most detectors will fail to
flag the repackaged app (and may instead mis-flag the original
as repackaged). In any case, discussions on Q&A sites such
as Stack Overflow [5] clearly show that there is a trend in
the developer community to investigate the different means
available to manipulate the last-modified time of a given zip
file such as an Android app package files.
Overall, we make the following contributions:
• Through three empirical studies, including two replication
studies on existing approaches (i.e., repackage analysis,
ML-based malware detection) and a new research inves-
tigation (i.e., app lineage analysis), we demonstrate that
time does matter for various Android-related research,
i.e., time is an important parameter that should be taken
into account.
• We empirically demonstrate that time inconsistency ac-
tually exists in Android app markets.
• We present a tool-supported approach called Moonlight-
Box, a static code analyzer, for mitigating potential
threats to the validity of Android research that requires
time information to form their approaches.
• We thoroughly investigate the effectiveness of Moon-
lightBox and its impact on state-of-the-art approaches.
We demonstrate that time is not only important for
various Android research directions but also sensitive for
conducting practical analyses.
II. TIME MATTERS FOR ANDROID RESEARCH
Our objective in this work is to call on an action for
Android-related researchers to seriously take app assembly
time into consideration, in order to avoid potential research
biases and mitigate potential threats to validity of their analy-
ses. To this end, we provide in this section several motivating
examples demonstrating the importance of time information
for various Android research.
A. ML-based Malware Detection
An increasingly large body of the literature on Android mal-
ware detection is leveraging machine learning (ML) techniques
to discriminate malicious from benign apps [6] [7] [8] [9].
Unfortunately, state-of-the-art approaches seldom take precau-
tions to avoid the situation where some apps in the training
set are historically posterior to apps in the testing set (i.e.,
learning from the future to test the past). This is known in
the field of machine learning as a data leakage threat to
validity [10]. Recently, a study by Allix et al. [4] has revealed
that simply selecting a random set of known malware to train
a ML-based malware detector, as it is done to validate most
approaches, will yield significantly biased results. Indeed, this
random selection may lead to a situation where some items
in the training set are actually “from the future” (in terms of
creation time) to items in the test set.
To further assess to what extent does app release time matter
in ML-based malware detection, we re-visit the ML-based
classification conducted in the state-of-the-art MUDFLOW
approach by Vitalii et al. [11]. We select this approach because
it is the first in the literature that leverages comprehensive
(and semantically sound) features to characterize behaviour
based on data flow. The authors have further made publicly
available all the evaluation artefacts including app samples
and their corresponding features so that we do not need to
perform the expensive feature extraction step. MUDFLOW
automatically identifies malware based on sensitive data flows
in Android apps. It implements a one-class classifier on a
set of benign apps and applies this classifier on a test set to
confirm that an app is benign, otherwise, it is malicious. In
the MUDFLOW repository, the dataset contains features for
around 2,500 benign apps and 15,000 malware apps. Since
the number of samples in the benign set is small and does not
allow to experiment with a significant timeline, we propose
to perform the one-class classification on the malware class,
learning to identify “malicious” data flow. Thus, we consider
training on malware samples to detect whether a sample is
malicious or not (see discussion in Section VI).
Fig. 1 illustrates the experimental setup of our ML-based
malware detection with two experimental testing procedures:
Experiment 1 randomly splits the malware set into three
subsets without accounting for the release time of test apps;
on the other hand, Experiment 2 regroups apps in three sets
according to release time. Note that although in the dataset
from MUDFLOW repository the majority of apps are old
(anterior to 2014), the insights of our investigations should
hold for recent samples. We then conduct three runs for each
experimental procedures switching the training and testing sets
between S1, S2 and S3: S1/S2 indicates that training is using
S1 while testing is performed on S2.
Experiment 1
S1 S2 S3
Experiment 2
Random Random Random
2011 20132012
App Set
S1/S3: Training S1, Testing S3
S1/S2 S2/S3
Fig. 1: Experimental Setup for ML-based malware detection.
For each experimental run, we randomly select 500 sam-
ples in the training set and 500 samples from the test sets.
We repeated this process 100 times to compute a reliable
average performance score. Fig. 2 depicts the distribution
of classification results (i.e., the number of apps correctly
predicted as malware) of our experiments. The median number
of correctly predicted apps for S1/S2, S1/S3, and S2/S3
are 206, 242.5, 225.5 (for Experiment 1) and 128.5, 128,
165.5 (for Experiment 2), respectively. We use the Mann-
Whitney-Wilcoxon (MWW) statistical test to confirm that
the differences between these two experimental results (e.g.,
between E1 : S1/S2 and E2 : S1/S2) are indeed statistically
significant: the resulting p-value confirms that the differences
are significant at a significance level2 of 0.01. We note that, in
Experiment 2, when the time is properly taken into account as
it should be in the scenario of zero-day3 malware detection,
the performance of the classifiers is actually limited.
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Fig. 2: ML-based malware detection results (E1, E2 stands for
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, respectively. Si/Sj means that the
classifier is trained on Si and then used to test Sj).
B. Repackaging Pair Construction
Repackaging is a serious threat to the Android ecosystem
as it enables plagiarists to redirect profits from legitimate app
developers, spreads malware on users’ devices, and increases
the workload of app maintainers [12], [13]. In less than 10
years, the research around this specific issue has produced
a large number of works according to recent literature sur-
veys [14] [15]. The majority of state-of-the-art approaches
identify repackaged apps based on similarity computation.
Fig. 3 illustrates a typical process of conducting pairwise
comparison for a given pair of Android apps. One essential
step in this process consists in discriminating the original app
from the repackaged one.
v4
v5
Similarity
Analysis
(Similarity > 90%)
Repackaging Detected
Time
Comparison v4 v5
Fig. 3: Example of Pairwise Comparison-based Repackaged App
Detection.
The RepackageRepo project [16] maintains a repackaging
dataset, containing in total 15,296 pairs, available to the
2Given a significance level α = 0.01, if p-value < α, there is one chance
in a hundred that the difference between the compared two datasets is due to
a coincidence.
3zero-day malware are malicious samples that were previously unknown.
Android research community. Each app pair (Apporiginal →
Apprepackaged) includes a benign (Apporiginal) and a ma-
licious (Apprepackaged) app. To the best of our knowledge,
and according to the description provided by the maintainers,
the pairs have been associated without accounting for the
implications of their release time. Instead, they leverage the
maliciousness status of apps in a pair to determine which one
is the repackaged one or the original one. We re-visit this
dataset to check the logic of association in each pair: in a
pair, a repackaged app must be posterior to its original. By
checking the assembly time of both apps for each of the 15,296
pairs, we found that 7,364 pairs (i.e., 48% of app pairs in
the RepackageRepo) are suspicious pairs since the malicious
Apprepackaged is released anteriorly to Apporiginal.
C. App Lineage Construction
An app lineage is represented as a time-ordered series of
some versions of the same app. Since markets only make
available the latest version of an app [17], it is often difficult
to collect over time the complete lineage of the apps: the rapid
updates in Android apps [18] makes it virtually impossible to
catch up on some versions after a short break in market watch.
Thus, app lineages in research datasets can miss some versions
as illustrated in Fig. 4 where the lineage of a given app has
missed some version instances.
App
Lineage
v1 v2 v5 v7 v8
Fig. 4: An App Lineage Example.
.
Nevertheless, even incomplete, app lineages constitute rele-
vant artefacts for understanding the app development process
as well as for facilitating advanced incremental analyses based
on the diff between consecutive versions. These analyses can
focus on API update trends, bug/vulnerability fix patterns [19],
malicious code injections, etc.
Constructing app lineages is, in theory, straightforward: the
versionCode attribute in the app’s manifest file should be con-
figured by developers to reflect the stage of the app evolution.
The bigger the versionCode, the most recent the version is.
Since every app is supposed to keep a unique app package
name [20], we can explore the 5 million apps in Androzoo [2]
repository to construct all available app lineages based on
the versionCode attribute. By only considering lineages that
contain at least three apps, we are able to collect 376,344 app
lineages. Fig. 5 plots the distribution of those lineages, where
the majority of lineages include less than 10 app versions.
Among the collected 376,344 lineages, we have identified
31,464 (8.4%) cases where at least one app in the lineage
provides a release time that is inconsistent with the order
constructed based on the versionCode: i.e., a given app version
vi presents an assembly time that is posterior to the subsequent
app version vi+1. This situation raises a validity-related ques-
tion of the lineages that are obtained without accounting for
release time, which in turn may impact various lineage-based
analyses.
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Fig. 5: Distribution lineages following their size.
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Fig. 6: Distribution of the size of app lineages that are constructed
from AndroZoo (above) and are questionable (bottom) because of
conflicts between app version code and assembly time.
Fig. 6 further illustrates the distribution of the size of app
lineages (i.e., the number of app versions in a lineage): while
in general, the median size of a lineage is very small, the
median size of lineages that contain versions with suspicious
release times is significantly higher than the median size when
all constructed lineages are considered. Inconsistencies mostly
occur in apps where developers appear to regularly release new
versions.
Overall, our empirical investigation of three Android app
data-intensive research directions reveals that considering
release time can be critical. Failure to take time into
consideration may lead to biased approaches and create
some threats to validity in performance assessments.
D. Time Inconsistency
Previously described motivating examples to convey the
essential message that failing to consider time release of apps
can negatively impact the validity of studies and assessments
of Android research approaches. We also warn that, even when
release time is taken into account, the reported performance
may be artificially biased since the app assembly time can
be easily manipulated. We refer to the symptom of such
manipulation, whether on purpose or by mistake (e.g., system
clock misconfiguration), as a time inconsistency.
Time inconsistencies can be symptomatic of an actual
intention to hide the real assembly time so as to deceive app
analysts in their time-dependent analysis processes: e.g., given
two similar apps, analysts could be tricked into flagging the
legitimate version as a repackaged version, when this version
displays an earlier release time, leading to invalid conclusions
on code changes, etc. It is thus paramount to combat time
inconsistency in order to mitigate the potential threats to
validity in several Android research directions. Nevertheless,
before proposing a solution to address this issue, we investi-
gate a research question (RQ-0) on the extent to which time
inconsistency is noteworthy in the Android ecosystem.
RQ-0: To what extent are real-world Android apps impacted
by time inconsistency?
Towards answering this research question, we leverage
the AndroZoo dataset metadata released by the repository
maintainers to collect the assembly times of the real-world
apps crawled from over 10 markets, including the official
Play Store. Figure 7 illustrates the distribution of the assembly
time of these apps. We observe that there are 91,328 Android
apps created before 2008 (i.e., supposedly before Android
was introduced), while 221 apps are assembled after 2017
(i.e., apparently in the future4). This finding presents a strong
evidence that time inconsistency indeed exists in the Android
ecosystem: at least 1.69% ( 91,328+2215,413,351 ) of real-world apps do
not present a correct assembly time.
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Fig. 7: Assembly times in AndroZoo’s app samples.
Given those extreme cases, we suspect that apps may also
present an assembly time that is reasonable (e.g., within the
range 2012-2016), but which is possibly incorrect. To highlight
such cases, we propose, in the next section, a static analysis-
based approach called MoonlightBox, which computes a lower
bound on the assembly time of a given Android app.
RQ-0 Answer
Time inconsistency does exist in the Android ecosystem.
By simply considering assembly times that are unrealistic
in practice, because an Android app cannot be built an-
teriorly to the release of the Android framework or in the
future, at least 1.69% of real-world Android apps, collected
from common markets and available to the research com-
munity, are impacted by time inconsistencies. We expect
the actual impact of time inconsistency to be significantly
higher, and advocate for an advanced strategy to mitigate
the impact of such attacks.
III. MOONLIGHTBOX
We propose to address time inconsistencies for mitigating
the threats to validity that they bring into Android research
directions which heavily depend on app assembly time.
4The dataset we used are collected from AndroZoo at 2017
Fig. 8 depicts the working process of MoonlightBox, our
approach to deal with time inconsistency. This process mainly
unfolds in three steps:
1) API Time Mapping (ATM) step, where we harvest the
introduction time of Android APIs and form a mapping
that takes as input an API and outputs the introduction
time of that API.
2) API Usage Modelling (AUM) step, where we harvest all
the Android APIs that are leveraged by a given app.
3) APK Time Prediction (ATP) step, where we compute the
lower bound in assembly time of a given app by matching
information collected from the previous two steps.
ATM
API Time Mapping
AUM
API Usage Modelling
ATP
APK Time Prediction
Time
Inconsistencies
Android
Framework
Android
App
MoonlightBox
Fig. 8: The working process of MoonlightBox.
A. API Time Mapping (ATM)
In this step, our aim is to build a reliable and reusable
mapping to enable our approach, and future research works,
to query the introduction time of a given Android API. To
this end, we rely on the historical information of the Android
framework code base in GitHub [21]. This repository is
suitable as it has recorded all the history commits (with API
level tags) of the code changes including the introduction of
new APIs. Because there are many redundant tags as well as
irrelevant tags (i.e., they do not necessarily come with new
APIs), we use a selection strategy to only consider the most
relevant tags:
• If several tags are committed at the same time, only the
one with the smallest version number is considered.
• If two subsequent tags are committed without adding new
APIs or deleting existing APIs, only the former one (with
smaller version number) is considered.
Overall, our approach has considered 79 tags out of over 200
tags that were initially available.
Algorithm 1 briefly summarizes the working process of the
ATM step. In the beginning, it attempts to load, in order to
directly update, a previously constructed API time map (line
2). If such map does not yet exist, MoonlightBox initializes
an empty map, then traverses the code of all the new tags
(i.e., all the new Android framework versions) found in the
code base repository. For each tag, MoonlightBox extracts all
defined Android API signatures (line 7) and, records (line 10)
or updates (line 13) them into the API time map. Eventually,
the map contains all APIs (identified based on their unique
full signature) associated with their introduction time.
As the algorithm shows, the ATM process for building the
API time mapping is in general rather straightforward. Nev-
ertheless, polymorphism feature of the Java language, which
Algorithm 1 API Time Mapping Construction.
1: procedure BUILDAPITIMEMAPPING(newTags)
2: apiT imeMap = load()
3: if apiT imeMap == null then
4: apiT imeMap← {}
5: end if
6: for each t ∈ newTags do
7: apis← associatedAPIs(t)
8: for each api ∈ apis do
9: if api /∈ apiT imeMap.keys then
10: apiT imeMap.put(api, t.time)
11: else
12: if apiT imeMap.get(api) > t.time then
13: apiT imeMap.put(api, t.time)
14: end if
15: end if
16: end for
17: end for
18: removeOverridedAPIs(apiT imeMap)
19: return apiT imeMap
20: end procedure
Android has inherited, creates situations where API introduc-
tion time is fluctuating depending on the position in the class
hierarchy. Consider Listing 1 for example: API writeToParcel()
was introduced in 2009 and has been overridden by class
MediaDescription in 2014. Naively, the API time mapping
should record that the API defined in MediaDescription is
available only starting in 2014. Yet an app developed in 2013
could have used this API in a MediaDescription object. Thus, a
naive approach could report a false positive time inconsistency
by considering that the lower bound for the API is 2014.
To make our approach more conservative, we overcome the
threats of such cases by 1) first identifying all polymorphism-
affected APIs in the Android codebase and 2) remapping
all such APIs with the corresponding earliest introduction
time. Overall, we have empirically found 2,227 polymorphism-
affected API cases, including 1,849 cases where an API is later
extended by other classes (like the one shown in Listing 1) and
378 cases where an API is introduced to one of its ancestor
classes (e.g., API size of class Bundle is introduced in 2009
while the same API is further defined by class BaseBundle in
2014, where BaseBundle is a superclass of Bundle).
1 public interface Parcelable {
2 //Introduced at 2009-09-02 22:39:46
3 public void writeToParcel(Parcel dest, int flags);
4 }
5 public class MediaDescription implements Parcelable {
6 //Introduced at 2014-10-28 04:29:57
7 @Override
8 public void writeToParcel(Parcel dest, int flags) {
9 dest.writeString(mMediaId);
10 ... ...
11 dest.writeBundle(mExtras);
12 }}
Listing 1: A challenge raised by polymorphism.
We remind the readers that the API time map constructed
in this step can be used independently and thus is reusable for
other approaches and tools.
B. API Usage Modelling (AUM)
The goal of this step is to identify all API methods that are
called in the code of a given Android app. Since, in general,
the source code of market apps is not publicly available,
MoonlightBox focuses purely on app bytecode. A common
challenge in Android app analysis lies also in the increasing
use of dynamic code loading by app developers: analyzers
must account for potential API usages in extra code outside the
main classes.dex code. Consequently, the API usage modelling
step should also locate any to-be dynamically loaded code
shipped5 with the APK, to extract relevant API usages. We
build on the heuristics proposed by Li et al. [22] to locate the
to-be dynamically loaded code: Given an app a, we unzip it
and visit all its embedded files, if it is a DEX file through its
magic number (035)6. If a given visited file is an archive file
(e.g., zip), we recursively look into it and check if it contains
DEX files. All the identified DEX files, along with the main
classes.dex file, are then considered for harvesting APIs.
Eventually, we rely on the Soot [23] analysis framework
to parse the whole located code, visiting all the statements to
identify calls into framework7 APIs. For each call, this module
attempts to match the whole signature, including its declared
class, return type, parameter list. Additionally, it also attempts
to identify the usage of such APIs that involve in Varargs and
generic types.
C. APK Time Prediction (ATP)
Given an Android app a, the constructed API time map
(denoted apiT imeMap), and the inferred API usage model
(denoted A), MoonlightBox implements a third step, ATP, for
API Time Prediction, which computes the lower bound t of a’s
assembly time. t is computed based on the following formula:
t = max(apiT imeMap.get(apii), apii ∈ A)
Let us consider a given app appx using two API methods
m1 (introduced in the SDK in January 2013) and m2 (intro-
duced in the SDK in March 2015). Since appx cannot use
API methods that have not been introduced yet, we are sure
that appx would not have been assembled before March 2015.
As a result, the lowest possible assembly time of appx is the
latest introduction time of all API methods used by appx (i.e.,
March 2015 in this example).
Note that since t is a lower bound computed by Moonlight-
Box, the actual assembly time could differ by a few months.
Indeed, as shown by McDonnell et al. [24], there is generally
several months delay before developers start to adopt newly
introduced APIs. On the other hand, once we find, for a
given app, that the lower bound t is bigger than the actual
assembly time, we can confirm that this app is affected by a
time inconsistency.
5Some additional code could be downloaded at runtime from a remote
server.
6Magic number defined in ISO-8859-1 is used to decide the type of a file.
7Thanks to the ATM step, we have the list of framework API methods.
IV. EVALUATION
Our evaluation addresses the following research questions:
• RQ-1: To what extent are real-world Android apps im-
pacted by time inconsistencies based on the lower time
bound obtained by MoonlightBox?
• RQ-2: Are time inconsistencies prevalent in similar pro-
portions between malicious and benign apps?
• RQ-3: Are time inconsistencies recurrent in specific app
lineages (i.e., apps from the same developers) or do they
occur equally in all lineages?
A. RQ-1: Impact Rate
To answer RQ-1, we randomly select 10,000 benign apps
crawled from Google Play store and apply MoonlightBox
to check whether their assembly time is consistent with the
inferred lower bound. Beforehand, following the criteria tested
in Section II-D, we immediately flag 163 apps as presenting
incorrect assembly time (i.e., before Android creation or in
the future).
By using MoonlightBox, we have further identified 558
apps that are involved in time inconsistencies: those apps are
presented as using Android APIs that were not yet available in
the SDK at the time of their release. Overall, we have identified
more than 7% of the apps (163+558 = 721 or 7.21%) subject
to time inconsistency.
As an example, the assembly time of the app
com.air.launcher indicates that the app has been
released around 2011-11-09. However, by looking into
its accessed APIs, MoonlightBox reports the app code
actually accesses API method getDescription() of class
android.os.storage.StorageVolume, which was only introduced
on 2016-07-14 (1,708 days later): this suggests that a time
inconsistency was likely performed.
Table I summarizes the top-10 accessed APIs for the 721
apps (163+558) whose introduction times contributed to define
the lower bound. We further found that the API methods
enumerated in this table are, each in the associated release of
the framework, among the most adopted by app developers.
Among other APIs that are released at the same time, those
APIs present the ones that are most favoured by Android
developers. We note that these APIs are either related to ac-
cessing sensitive data (i.e., permission-specific) or about user
interface (i.e., layout), which suggests that, despite developers
attempting to manipulate the assembly time, they keep their
apps up-to-date with regards to system capabilities in terms of
sensitive data access and user interface improvement.
We further consider the 721 identified apps involving time
inconsistency and investigate whether some specific time slots
are favoured by attackers. We find that the majority (over 75%)
of assembly times are distinct from each other, suggesting
a random selection of inconsistency time. As reported on
Table II, we only find nine assembly time cases that are each
associated with more than 1 app. In the noteworthy case of
assembly time 1979-11-30 00:00:00 associated with 157 apps,
it actually relates to an issue raised by app developers about
default configurations [25].
TABLE I: Top 10 Accessed APIs that Contribute to the Identification
of Lower Bound Time of Android Apps.
API Count
android.app.Activity: void requestPermissions(String[],int) 2536
android.app.Activity: boolean shouldShowRequestPermissionRationale(String) 2396
android.widget.PopupWindow: void setWindowLayoutType(int) 2381
android.widget.PopupWindow: void setOverlapAnchor(boolean) 2363
android.widget.CompoundButton: Drawable getButtonDrawable() 2327
android.graphics.drawable.Drawable: boolean setLayoutDirection(int) 2294
android.graphics.drawable.Drawable: int getLayoutDirection() 2244
android.content.Context: int getColor(int) 2200
android.app.AppOpsManager: int noteProxyOp(String,String) 2178
android.app.AppOpsManager: String permissionToOp(String) 2178
TABLE II: Nine Assembly (Inconsistent) Time that appear in at least
Two Infected Apps.
Time Count Time Count
1979-11-30 00:00:00 157 2013-12-16 17:01:16 7
2011-11-22 03:02:34 6 2008-02-29 10:33:46 5
2014-09-14 17:21:42 3 2008-02-29 03:33:46 2
2011-11-09 19:50:26 2 2012-03-03 22:09:04 2
2013-12-16 09:01:16 2
We take the opportunity of this study to investigate delays
with which new APIs are adopted by app developers. We
compute the delay based on apps that are not flagged as
infected by time inconsistency, following the formula:
delay = dexT ime− lowerBoundT ime
Fig 9 illustrates the delays distribution. Over half of the
considered apps have a delay of over 317 days (close to
one year). Some outlier delays can reach up to 1,000 days,
suggesting potential time inconsistency that is not explored in
this study: those are indeed related to a potential upper bound
usage of APIs (i.e., when API methods cannot possibly be
used any more in an app).
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Fig. 9: Distribution on the Delays (in days) of Leveraging New
Introduced APIs.
RQ-1 Answer
Answer to RQ-1: Over 7% of randomly selected real-
world benign apps are infected by time inconsistencies,
which is alarming, since, translated in terms of absolute
number on GooglePlay, about 210,000 apps (7% of 3
million) have an inconsistent releasing time. Additionally,
this study allowed to show that APIs that access sensitive
data or leverage advanced user interface capabilities are
more rapidly adopted by Android developers.
B. RQ-2: Malicious Vs. Benign
To answer RQ-2, we randomly select 10,000 malicious apps
from AndroZoo [2] and investigate the proportion of time
inconsistency infected apps, in comparison with the previous
impact study on benign apps. After applying MoonlightBox
TABLE III: The 75 app lineages associated to “com.sinosoft”.
Lineage Versions Infected Lineage Versions Infected
com.sinosoft.chahao901 3 3 com.sinosoft.chahao 26 26
com.sinosoft.sinafinance 24 24 com.sinosoft.bubujingxin 6 6
com.sinosoft.jddxylk 25 25 com.sinosoft.sxwqn 11 11
com.sinosoft.starpic 21 21 com.sinosoft.sjsxwqn 25 25
com.sinosoft.baidukanshu 25 25 com.sinosoft.star 19 19
com.sinosoft.egun 4 4 com.sinosoft.raokoulin 23 23
com.sinosoft.naoliceshi 4 4 com.sinosoft.zhougong 26 26
com.sinosoft.renpinjisuanqi 5 5 com.sinosoft.chayoubian 20 20
com.sinosoft.shoudiantong910 7 7 com.sinosoft.xiaohuajizhongying 4 4
com.sinosoft.wsty 5 5 com.sinosoft.ybgjm 5 5
com.sinosoft.chakuaidi 19 19 com.sinosoft.xieshen 7 7
com.sinosoft.meituitianxia908 3 3 com.sinosoft.njjzw 4 4
com.sinosoft.yushi 26 26 com.sinosoft.wdwmny 4 4
com.sinosoft.sinahouse 21 21 com.sinosoft.zhen 4 4
com.sinosoft.liuying 5 5 com.sinosoft.lieche 25 25
com.sinosoft.compass 22 22 com.sinosoft.lieren 8 8
com.sinosoft.fengliusanguo 5 5 com.sinosoft.mimi 21 21
com.sinosoft.mwgs 7 7 com.sinosoft.xuezu 5 5
com.sinosoft.nba 22 22 com.sinosoft.llk 16 16
com.sinosoft.wdlpsmd 5 5 com.sinosoft.momeinv 4 4
com.sinosoft.chatianqi 24 24 com.sinosoft.emnqyd 8 8
com.sinosoft.xiaosangansidui 3 3 com.sinosoft.water 20 20
com.sinosoft.huanshou1 6 6 com.sinosoft.hxzcdxmq 6 6
com.sinosoft.chaip 17 17 com.sinosoft.guichuideng 5 5
com.sinosoft.saolei910 7 7 com.sinosoft.wangyou 7 7
com.sinosoft.xingganchemo907 4 4 com.sinosoft.crazyybp 25 25
com.sinosoft.xingzuoyunshi 18 18 com.sinosoft.qipaomeini908 4 4
com.sinosoft.naojinjizhuanwan 21 21 com.sinosoft.duanxinwzw 18 18
com.sinosoft.chashouji 23 23 com.sinosoft.xiaohuatiankong 9 9
com.sinosoft.bxwwylk 21 21 com.sinosoft.chagongjiao 27 27
com.sinosoft.renxing 5 5 com.sinosoft.chashenfenzheng 22 22
com.sinosoft.huli 6 6 com.sinosoft.shenrimima 19 19
com.sinosoft.baoxiaowangwen 16 16 com.sinosoft.jpjs 7 7
com.sinosoft.miyu 4 4 com.sinosoft.news 22 22
com.sinosoft.shenxiaoyunshi 17 17 com.sinosoft.zhuxian 7 7
com.sinosoft.baigu 5 5 com.sinosoft.ntsj 5 5
com.sinosoft.lishi 25 25 com.sinosoft.qingchenghuangfei 5 4
com.sinosoft.xiaohua 42 41
on those malicious apps, based on the lower bound times
inferred by MoonlightBox, we identify 1,396 apps that present
suspicious assembly times. This number is significantly higher
than the number of infected benign apps. As it is commonly
known in the Android security community [26], the majority
of malicious apps are built by repackaging benign apps. In
order to hide such repackaging traits which could be detected
by checking their similarity with previous (in terms of release
time) apps, attackers may artificially manipulate the app as-
sembly time.
Fig. 10 illustrates the distribution of delays for adopting new
APIs in malware and benign apps. We observe that, overall,
the delays have fewer variations across benign apps than
across malicious apps, and malware presents longer delays
than benign apps. The statistical significance of the difference
of median delay values suggests that malware apps less often
use up-to-date APIs.
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Fig. 10: Delays between benign and malicious apps.
RQ-2 Answer
Answer to RQ-2: Malicious apps are more likely to be
affected by time inconsistency, compared to benign apps.
They also have longer delays in terms of adopting new
released Android APIs.
C. RQ-3: Specific App Lineages
RQ-3 investigates whether time inconsistencies are favoured
in some specific app lineages. To this end, we randomly
select 5,000 app lineages from the lineage set we have built
previously (cf. Section II-C). Application of MoonlightBox
reveals that 842 (out of the 5,000) lineages contain at least
one app version that is affected by time inconsistency. Over
half of those lineages have at least two app versions that are
affected. This suggests that once an app version is affected
by time inconsistency, there is more than 50% probability
that there are another one of its peers in a lineage that is
affected. We also found 153 app lineages where, in each, all
of their app versions are affected by time inconsistency. As
an example, 75 app lineages8 are associated with a single
company using “com.sinosoft” as the package name. Table III
enumerates those app lineages, along with the number of app
versions inside and the number of apps being infected by
time inconsistencies. Among the 75 app lineages, 73 of them
have all of their apps been infected by time inconsistency.
Overall, there are in total 1,001 app versions developed by
“com.sinosoft” with 999 apps being affected by time incon-
sistency. Towards understanding why those apps are attacked9,
our further investigation reveals that 971 (92%) apps are
actually malicious, thanks to VirusTotal’s reports. This finding
confirms to our previous finding showing that malicious apps
are more likely to be affected by time inconsistency, which
also suggests a potential implication of our approach: Given
an app lineage, if most of their app versions are infected by
time inconsistency, those apps in the lineage will likely be
malicious apps.
RQ-3 Answer
Answer to RQ-3: Time inconsistencies are favored by some
specific app lineages, where their developers are likely to
manipulate the assembly time of their developed apps.
V. IMPLICATIONS
In Section II, we have introduced three motivating examples
showing that time information is important for various Android
research directions. We now revisit these studies by replacing
app assembly time with the lower bound time computed by
MoonlightBox.
A. Performing Realistic ML-based Classifications
ML-based malware detection approaches that aim at detect-
ing zero-day malware should be historically coherent, i.e., the
training set should only contain apps preceding the ones of
the testing set. Indeed, realistic settings would assume that it
is impossible to learn from the future. Since the app assembly
time can be manipulated, experiments based on this time could
8Note that 75 is the number we have obtained from the AndroZoo project.
In reality, the company could have developed more apps.
9We actually planned to achieve this purpose by contacting the app
developer. Unfortunately, we cannot do that because we could not find the
developer’s contact information, which could be justified by the fact that most
of those apps are actually malware.
still be subject to threats to validity. To further demonstrate
this claim, we replicate the second experiment described in
Section II-A whose initial results are presented in Fig. 2. In
this new experiment, referred to as experiment 3, we keep the
same settings as experiment 2 except that now we align the
timelines for S1, S2 and S3 based on the lower bound time
computed by MoonlightBox instead of the app assembly time
as previously done in experiment 2.
Table IV provides the classification results in terms of
detection accuracy for the three experimental settings. Overall,
we note that the performance drops when we get the timelines
to be closer to the reality of app release time. The differences
of performance can be explained by the fact that training
samples in experiment 2 may not be “accurate”, because of
time inconsistencies, in the sense that some apps in the training
set may still be misplaced since they are from the future and
thus create a data leakage problem. Nevertheless, assembly
time remains a close approximation of release time since the
result of experiment 2 is only slightly better than experiment
3 but much worse than experiment 1. The reason why the
result of experiment 3 is worse than experiment 2 is that
inconsistency in assembly time introduces biases in training
classifiers: training data contains future knowledge, leading to
artificial performance (just like a blind random sampling of
experiment 1).
Our experimental setting highlights the potential impact of
dealing with time-inconsistent datasets. Using MoonlightBox
to correct time alignment creates realistic settings that require
malware detection researchers to investigate new features to
improve performance in the wild. This experiment results
further suggest that Android malware by themselves evolve
fast. It is hard to predict new types of malware by only learning
features from known malware. This phenomenon probably
explains why there are already hundreds of ML-based malware
detectors presented in research but barely any of them is
applied in practice.
TABLE IV: ML-based malware detection results (accuracy in me-
dian).
Experiments S1/S2 S2/S3 S1/S3
Experiment 1 (random) 41.2% 48.4% 45.1%
Experiment 2 (assembly time) 25.7% 25.6% 33.1%
Experiment 3 (API-based lower bound time) 5.4% 20% 25.3%
B. Validating Repackaging Datasets
In Section II-B, we have empirically shown that the Repack-
ageRepo project contains benchmark data on repackaging
pairs that may actually be of unreliable quality (half of the
collected pairs involve an app tagged as repackaged but which
was actually released before the original app according to
assembly time). Since this benchmark will be relied upon in
the community, we propose to properly assess it based on
MoonlightBox’s lower bound time.
Table V summarizes the verification results. Previously
(based on app assembly time), we have shown that 7,364 pairs
could be questioned (because the repackaged app appears to
be more recent than the original app), accounting for 48%
of the total pairs. However, based on the time information
returned by MoonlightBox, it appears that 15,218, i.e., most
of the repackaged apps, are not released before their original
counterpart. Concretely 7,328 (99.5%) out of the 7,364 “ques-
tionable” pairs are proven to be false alarms in the previous
investigation (i.e., those apps are simply suffering from time
inconsistencies). Similarly, we find that some repackaged pairs
which appeared to be correctly aligned in the timeline were
spotted by MoonlightBox. We enumerated only 42 of such
pairs which we report as false negatives. These results show
that time inconsistencies can cause both false positive and false
negative results for building repackaging app pairs.
TABLE V: Release time investigation for all the pairs available in
the RepackageRepo project.
Pairs App Assembly Time Lower Bound Time
Normal 7,932 (51.9%) 15,218 (99.5%)
Questionable 7,364 (48.1%) 78 (0.5%)
Total 15,296 (100%) 15,296 (100%)
To increase confidence in the benchmark in RepackageRepo,
we have informed its authors and provided them with infor-
mation to share with potential users.
C. Building Reliable App Lineages
We now revisit, with MoonlightBox, the study presented in
Section II-C on the re-construction of app lineages. Since (1)
we expected to face scalability issues10 in applying Moon-
lightBox on all the 5 million apps available in the AndroZoo
project and (2) because our focus is more on the time validity
of two successive versions of an app (the assembly time of vi
should precede the assembly time of vi+1) rather than on the
time validity of a whole lineage, we opt to randomly select
30,000 app pairs (appvx , appvy ) where appvx and appvy are
two successive versions of the same app.
First, by investigating the assembly time of each pair, we
found exactly 29,000 pairs which seem “normal”, i.e., the
assembly time of appvx precedes the one of appvy . The
remaining 1,000 pairs are however “questionable”, i.e., the
assembly time of appvx is posterior to the one of appvy .
Then, we compute with MoonlightBox the lower bound
time of each app in the pairs, and we compare the “time
validity” of each pair with the one obtained by using the
assembly time. Table VI summarizes the experimental results.
481 pairs among the initial 29,000 “normal” pairs are now
flagged as questionable: these are thus false negatives of the
approach with assembly time. In contrast, 966 pairs included
in the initial 1,000 questionable pairs are now flagged as
normal: these are thus false positives of the assembly time-
based approach.
10In practice, it is challenging to collect all the apps provided by the
Androzoo maintainers, because of network bandwidth and storage constraints.
TABLE VI: Release time investigation for all 30,000 randomly
selected pairs of subsequent app versions from 7,445 app lineages.
Pairs App Assembly Time Lower Bound Time
Normal 29,000 (96.7%) 29,485 (98.3%)
Questionable 1000 (3.3%) 515 (1.7%)
Total 30,000 (100%) 30,000 (100%)
Overall, these revisiting studies empirically show that time
indeed matters for various Android-related research. How-
ever, the accuracy of the obtained time information is even
crucial for the final results.
VI. THREATS TO VALIDITY AND DISCUSSION
The first threat to the validity of our approach lies in the
selection of the datasets. The apps collected from Androzoo
may not be representative. This threat is mitigated by the
fact that Androzoo is the largest and most up-to-date research
dataset in the Android community. Furthermore, we have ran-
domly sampled those apps, the large majority being available
in Google Play.
App assembly time may not be perfectly accurate to rep-
resent the app releasing time. Ideally, we should obtain the
release time (along with other relevant metadata) from app
markets. Unfortunately, in practice, it is only possible (with
substantial engineering work and large, dedicated computing
infrastructure) to collect such information for apps that are
currently present in markets. Nevertheless, it is virtually im-
possible to retrieve such metadata for previous app versions,
mainly because these metadata are overwritten with data of
updated app versions. To the best of our knowledge, no sig-
nificant dataset, including AndroZoo, is providing app versions
with release metadata.
MoonlightBox is strictly focused on inferring the lower
bound release time of an Android app. There may exist
cases where time inconsistency is performed by replacing the
actual date with a reasonably more recent date. Detecting
such inconsistencies would involve inferring the upper bound
release time of an app. Nevertheless, given that app developers
generally use recent APIs to keep up with the latest OS
features, manipulation distances in such cases are short, thus
leading to limited impact. MoonlightBox thus focuses on
inconsistencies going beyond the lower bound. We hope our
work will stimulate new interests in our community for more
contributions to addressing the problem. We also plan to
investigate this aspect with an heuristic-based approach in
future work.
Based on the lower bound release time computed by Moon-
lightBox, we have experimentally demonstrated the existence
of time inconsistencies in the Android ecosystem. Although
we have seen evidence in developer Q&A sites that some
developers are interested in learning how to perform time
manipulation, we do not have further concrete evidence on
the practical benefits of these attacks beyond the motivating
examples on biasing research approaches. It could also be that
most cases of time inconsistencies are actually developer mis-
takes. Nevertheless, our findings clearly indicate that malware
(including repackaged apps) are more likely to be affected
by time inconsistency, suggesting a correlation with malicious
intent.
Finally, for the motivating example on ML-based classi-
fication, we have opted to change the scenario of train/test
used in the original MUDFLOW [27] paper given the limited
set of benign apps provided in the paper repository which
could not allow to properly highlight the timeline issue. We
did not attempt to build a reliable dataset but simply reused
the one provided by MUDFLOW, which could be the reason
why our ML-based approach achieves low accuracy. In any
case, the objective of this paper was not to focus on the
performance of the MUDFLOW approach, but rather the
performance gap caused by a manipulation of the timeline
in dataset construction.
VII. RELATED WORK
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to empirically
investigate, characterize and combat time inconsistencies in
the Android ecosystem. Even if some works do consider time
information (e.g., the last-modified time of the main DEX file
building from the app source code) in their approach, they
never question the validity of their approaches impacted by
the time considered.
There are several studies proposed in the literature to devise
reliable experimental protocols [28] [29] [30]. As argued by
Blackburn et al. [28], an unsound empirical finding may
misdirect a whole field, encourage the pursuit of unworthy
ideas. Pieterse et al. [30] argue that researchers should ensure
a rigorous design of their experiments and apply software
performance measurements techniques to guarantee reliable
results, so as to support the repeatability of their experiments,
comparability of their reported results, and verifiability of
their claims. The findings of those studies help to ensure
that research directions and results are in line with practices.
Our work follows the same objectives, aiming to highlight
the importance of building a reliable experimental setting and
thus to make the results more useful for real-world problems
and to help individuals conduct better science and encourage
a cultural shift in our community to identify and promulgate
sound claims.
Similar to our work, other works such as the one done
by McDonnell et al. [24] and the ones completed by Li et
al. [31], [32], [33] have also attempted to map API calls to
their exact releases so as to resolve various API-related issues,
e.g., study the stability and adoption of Android APIs [24].
Allix et al. [4] have experimentally discussed the importance
of considering history information (i.e., time) for ML-based
malware detection of Android apps. As shown in their study,
most state-of-the-art assessment scenarios in the literature of
ML-based malware detection simply pick a random set of
known malware to train a malware classifier. This setup yields
significantly biased results [34] [35] [36] when the objective
is to detect zero-day malware, where by definition, malware is
not known yet. To be realistic, in such scenarios the training set
should only contain apps that precede the ones of the testing
set. Even if Allix et al. have demonstrated that time matters
for ML-based malware detection, their experimental evaluation
suffers from the threat to validity since their training/test sets
are built based on the app assembly time (DEX file time),
which, as shown in this work, is subject to time inconsis-
tencies. MoonlightBox can be leveraged to complement their
work by ensuring a more accurate experimental setting leading
to more reliable experimental results.
Many related works focusing on Android app repackaging
detection such as [37], [38] and [39] have distinguished
repackaged apps from original ones. However, those works
do not take time information into consideration, resulting
in potential threats to the validity of their approaches. As
an example, Li et al. [38] have collected a benchmark of
repackaged Android app pairs without taking time information
into account. The original and repackaged apps are actually
distinguished based on their malicious status. As confirmed
by our replication study described in Section V, this kind of
benchmark is questionable since it can contain app pair for
which the repackaged app has been created before the birth of
its original counterpart. This problem would impact empirical
findings leveraging such benchmark but also other works that
are performed on similar benchmarks (e.g., FSquaDRA2 [40]).
Some works such as [41] [42] [43] explicitly mention that
their purpose is to detect repackaging Android app pairs but
not to identify which is the original one and which is the
cloned one. In order to further leverage the results reported by
their approaches, one has to come up with a reliable approach
to distinguish between the original and repackaged ones.
MoonlightBox can actually be leveraged to partially support
this purpose. The advantage of applying MoonlightBox in this
setting is that the results (e.g., which one is repackaged?)
yielded by MoonlightBox will hardly be wrong, although it
is not capable of handling all the possible cases, (e.g., some
repackaged apps only make small changes to their original
counterparts, remaining same lower bound time between the
compared two apps).
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we first experimentally demonstrated that
omitting to consider release time (approximated by app as-
sembly time) may lead to biased approaches and introduce
threats to validity in performance assessments. However, we
also showed that assembly time is often affected by a new
symptom, namely time inconsistency. To overcome this symp-
tom, we proposed a prototype tool name MoonlightBox which
could be used by researchers and practitioners to mitigate
potential threats to validity in the performance of their as-
sessments. We investigated the extent to which MoonlightBox
can help break down insights on time inconsistency, using a
large number of real Android apps.
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